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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter comes on before this court on appeal from an 
order of the district court entered December 29, 2000, 
granting a summary judgment upholding an arbitrator's 
decision that the United States Postal Service had"just 
cause" to terminate letter carrier Carmelita Colatat's 
employment. The arbitrator found that Colatat knowingly 
filed an application for workers' compensation benefits 
under the Federal Employee Compensation Act ("FECA"), 
falsely claiming that she suffered a work-related knee injury 
and that this conduct constituted "just cause" for her 
dismissal. Her union, the National Association of Letter 
Carriers, AFL-CIO ("NALC"), brought this action and brings 
this appeal, contending that the arbitrator erred by 
rendering a decision inconsistent with a determination of 
the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs ("OWCP") 
that she had been injured at work. In particular, NALC 
argues that OWCP's factual determinations were binding on 
the arbitrator pursuant to 5 U.S.C. S 8128(b). 
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This case arose from events on October 6, 1998, when 
Colatat reported to her supervisor that her knee was in 
pain and that she could not walk. As a result, she was 
taken in an ambulance to a hospital emergency room for 
treatment. Two days later, Colatat submitted a form CA-1, 
"Federal Employee's Notice of Traumatic Injury and Claim 
for Continuation of Pay or Compensation," that was an 
application to the Department of Labor (DOL) for workers' 
compensation benefits under FECA. On the CA-1 form 
Colatat indicated that she injured her knee while lifting 60- 
pound trays of mail at work. The Postal Service contested 
her claim by submitting written statements from other 
postal employees who heard Colatat admit she had been 
injured outside of work. 
 
OWCP, an agency of Department of Labor in charge of 
claims made under FECA, denied Colatat's claim on 
November 25, 1998, crediting the statements of her fellow 
postal employees. On January 22, 1999, Colatat asked 
OWCP to reconsider her application and on June 30, 1999, 
OWCP reversed its earlier decision and granted her FECA 
benefits. OWCP in its June 30 decision found that Colatat's 
claim was "supported by a neighbor's statement that she 
was performing yard work [on October 6, 1998] and 
evidenced no knee problems and statements by her co- 
workers that she initially displayed no signs of such a 
problem upon reporting to work." 
 
On January 4, 1999, during the period between OWCP's 
two decisions, the Postal Service, based on an additional 
investigation of the claim by the Postal Inspection Service, 
issued Colatat a Notice of Removal charging that she 
submitted the form CA-1 knowing it to be false. The postal 
workers' collective bargaining agreement authorized this 
action as it provides that the service may terminate postal 
workers for "just cause," but establishes a grievance 
procedure culminating in a hearing before an arbitrator to 
determine the existence of "just cause." NALC filed a timely 
grievance challenging Colatat's removal, which was denied 
at each step of the grievance procedure, following which 
NALC sought arbitration. The arbitrator heard Colatat's 
appeal from the grievance procedure on June 4, 1999, and 
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October 29, 1999, and then held in an award dated 
December 15, 1999, that Colatat had submitted the form 
CA-1 seeking FECA benefits knowing it to be false and that 
her conduct constituted just cause for her removal from 
service. When making his award, the arbitrator was aware 
of the June 30, 1999 OWCP decision, but did not feel 
bound by it. 
 
Thereafter NALC instituted this action contending that 
the court should vacate the arbitration award because it 
was contrary to public policy and violated the plain 
language of the postal workers' collective bargaining 
agreement. In addition, NALC sought a writ of mandamus 
compelling the Postal Service to reinstate Colatat to her 
position. The union predicated its argument on section 
8128(b) which it contended bound the arbitrator to OWCP's 
factual determinations. It argued that the arbitrator could 
not validly uphold Colatat's dismissal because OWCP had 
awarded her benefits and therefore did not believe that she 
filed a false CA-1 form. After filing its answer to the 
complaint, the Postal Service moved for and obtained a 
summary judgment upholding the arbitration order. NALC 
then filed this appeal.1 
 
On April 19, 2001, while this appeal was pending, OWCP, 
on motion of the Secretary of Labor, reversed its decision 
awarding Colatat workers' compensation benefits, as it 
concluded that in light of all of the evidence, Colatat had 
not demonstrated that she suffered a work-related injury. 
In determining to take this action, OWCP was impressed 
that the ambulance driver, who had responded on October 
6, 1998, to the report of the injury, submitted a statement 
to a Postal Service investigator stating that Colatat told him 
that "it was an old injury that had flared up[and] . . . upon 
questioning stated that it did not happen at work." OWCP 
also was impressed by a statement of an emergency 
medical technician, who was in the ambulance, reciting 
that Colatat told him that "she had hurt her knee the night 
before playing tennis, [but] didn't feel it necessary to call 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had jurisdiction to review the arbitrator's award 
under 39 U.S.C. S 1208 and 28 U.S.C. S 1331, and we have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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911 that night because she felt the pain would go away." As 
might be expected, the Postal Service moved for this court 
to take judicial notice of OWCP's April 19, 2001 decision, 




The question for us to answer is whether the arbitrator 
should have followed OWCP's factual conclusions, which, at 
the time he ruled, were consistent with Colatat's claim. 
NALC urges, of course, that he should have done so and 
thus that the district court erred in granting the Postal 
Service summary judgment. We exercise plenary review on 
this appeal. See Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Tech., 
Inc., 186 F.3d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 1999). Of course, while we 
can affirm only if there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the Postal Service is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), it is 
obvious that the issues on appeal are purely matters of law. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that "[j]udicial review of a 
labor-arbitration pursuant to [a collective bargaining] 
agreement is very limited." Major League Baseball Players 
Ass'n v. Garvey, 121 S.Ct. 1724, 1728 (2001) (per curiam). 
Thus, a court should not "review the arbitrator's decision 
on the merits despite allegations that the decision rests on 
factual errors or misinterprets the parties' agreement." Id. 
Therefore, if the arbitration award draws its essence from 
the collective bargaining agreement, a court should uphold 
it. See United Parcel Serv. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 55 F.3d 
138, 141 (3d Cir. 1995). This rule of deference derives from 
the Court's recognition that the parties to the collective 
bargaining agreement "bargained for" a procedure in which 
an arbitrator would interpret the agreement. See Eastern 
Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 
62, 121 S.Ct. 462, 466 (2000). We have recognized the 
narrow scope of review that district courts exercise over 
labor arbitrators' awards as we have "wryly concluded, `[i]t 
should be clear that the test used to probe the validity of a 
labor arbitrator's decision is a singularly undemanding 
one.' " United Trans. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit 
Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting News Am. 
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Publ'ns, Inc. v. Newark Typographical Union, Local 103, 918 
F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
 
The Supreme Court nevertheless has recognized two 
situations in which a reviewing court may vacate an 
arbitration award. First, the reviewing court may vacate the 
award if the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement was "contrary to public policy." 
Eastern Associated, 531 U.S. at 62, 121 S.Ct. at 467 
(quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of 
United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 
2183 (1983)). "The Court has made clear that any such 
public policy must be explicit, well defined, and dominant. 
It must be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal 
precedents and not from general considerations of 
supposed public interests." Id., 121 S.Ct. at 467 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). We treat the inquiry 
into whether an arbitration award is "contrary to public 
policy" as requiring a determination of whether there is "a 
well defined and dominant public policy," and, if so, 
"whether the arbitrator's award, as reflected in his or her 
interpretation of the agreement, violate[s] the public policy." 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1283, 
1291-92 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
The second situation in which a reviewing court may 
vacate an arbitration award is when the court concludes 
that the arbitrator has ignored the plain language of the 
collective bargaining agreement. Eastern Associated, 531 
U.S. at 62, 121 S.Ct. at 466 (citing United Paperworkers 
Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 
S.Ct. 364, 371 (1987)). " `But as long as[an honest] 
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the 
contract and acting withing the scope of his authority,' the 
fact that `a court is convinced he committed serious error 
does not suffice to overturn his decision.' " Id., 121 S.Ct. at 
466 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38, 108 S.Ct. at 371). The 
language of the collective bargaining agreement at issue in 
this case provides: 
 
       Employees covered by this Agreement shall be covered 
       by Subchapter I of Chapter 81 of Title 5, and any 
       amendments thereto, relating to compensation for work 
       injuries. The Employer will promulgate appropriate 
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       regulations which comply with applicable regulations of 
       the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs and any 
       amendments thereto. 
 
App. at 63. The statutes referred to in the collective 
bargaining agreement include section 8128(b). 
 
NALC seeks an order vacating the arbitration award 
contending that the arbitrator's award was against public 
policy and ignored the plain language of the collective 
bargaining agreement. But the arguments conflate because 
each rests on the contention that the arbitrator erred in 
rendering a decision that, contrary to section 8128(b), 
conflicted with OWCP's factual conclusions. Therefore, the 
controlling questions on this appeal are (1) whether NALC 
is correct that section 8128(b) required that OWCP's factual 
conclusions bind the arbitrator; and, if so, (2) whether the 
section 8128(b) requirement is "explicit, well defined, 
dominant" or clear enough so that we should hold that by 
not applying section 8128(b) the arbitrator ignored the 
plain language of the collective bargaining agreement. 
Inasmuch as we hold that section 8128(b) is not preclusive 
we do not reach the second question. 
 
Section 8128 provides: 
 
       (a) The Secretary of Labor may review an award for or 
       against payment of compensation at any time on his 
       own motion or on application. The Secretary, in 
       accordance with the facts found on review, may- 
 
       (1) end, decrease, or increase the compensation 
       previously awarded; or 
 
       (2) award compensation previously refused or 
       discontinued. 
 
       (b) The action of the Secretary of his designee in 
       allowing or denying a payment under this subchapter 
       is- 
 
       (1) final and conclusive for all purposes and with 
       respect to all questions of law and fact; and 
 
       (2) not subject to review by another official of the 
       United States or by a court by mandamus or otherwise. 
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The Secretary's designee is OWCP. The arguments here 
focus on the meaning of section 8128(b)(1), which states 
that an OWCP decision is "final and conclusive for all 
purposes and with respect to all questions of law and fact." 
NALC argues that we should read this language to mean 
that all of OWCP's factual and legal determinations are 
binding on all courts and tribunals adjudicating disputes 
predicated on the same set of facts as those OWCP 
considered. The Postal Service contends that we should 
read section 8128(b) to apply only to "the action of the 
Secretary . . . in allowing or denying a payment under this 
subchapter." Under this reading, "the Act simply reserves 
the Secretary the exclusive authority to make final 
determinations with respect to granting or denying 
payments, and such decisions cannot be challenged 
elsewhere." Br. at 8. 
 
While we have not addressed the issue, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and a district court have 
adopted the Postal Service's interpretation that section 
8128(b) only precludes subsequent courts and tribunals 
from challenging or contradicting OWCP's factual or legal 
determinations with respect to granting or denying 
payments under FECA. See Minor v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
819 F.2d 280 (Fed. Cir. 1987); United States v. Carpentieri, 
23 F. Supp. 2d 433 (S.D.N.Y 1988). Both of these courts 
held that in proceedings following OWCP determinations 
courts are bound only by the "Labor Department's 
decisions on the making or denying of compensation 
awards," and are not bound by the OWCP's factual 
conclusions. Minor, 819 F.2d at 283; see Carpentieri, 23 F. 
Supp.2d at 438. 
 
Minor involved an appeal by a Postal Service employee 
from the Merit System Protection Board's ("MSPB") 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of her appeal from the 
Postal Service's denial of her request for restoration to her 
former position as a distribution clerk. Minor, claiming that 
she was injured at work, filed a claim for FECA benefits. 
OWCP initially awarded her benefits. The Postal Service 
then became suspicious of her claim, investigated the 
matter, and terminated her employment on the ground that 
she lied on her application for benefits. Her union 
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challenged the grounds for her dismissal and 
unsuccessfully invoked the applicable grievance procedures 
and then sought arbitration. The arbitrator analyzed the 
site of the accident and the testimony at the hearing and 
concluded that the accident could not have happened as 
Minor described. See Minor, 819 F.2d at 281. Consequently, 
he gave Minor the opportunity to resign or be removed for 
just cause. She did not resign and thus was removed. Id. 
Subsequently, OWCP reconsidered its compensation award 
and terminated Minor's FECA benefits. Minor, however, 
then appealed OWCP's decision to the Employees' 
Compensation Appeals Board, which overturned the OWCP 
decision terminating benefits and remanded the matter to 
OWCP for a de novo decision. OWCP then retroactively 
terminated Minor's benefits. 
 
After the Employees' Compensation Appeals Board 
decision, Minor sought restoration to her position but her 
application was denied on the ground that she was 
removed for cause after filing a false claim. Id. at 282. 
Minor then appealed this denial to the MSPB which found 
that Minor had been removed for cause by reason of having 
filed a false claim and, therefore, that it did not have 
authority to order her restoration because the regulation on 
which she was relying to establish her entitlement to 
reinstatement applied only to employees whose employment 
had been suspended due to a "compensable injury." Minor 
then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. 
 
In the court of appeals the issue was whether Minor was 
removed by reason of a compensable injury or for cause 
because the MSPB's jurisdiction was limited to situations in 
which the removal had been by reason of a compensable 
injury. The court noted that: 
 
       The complexity arises from the formal ruling of the 
       Employees' Compensation Appeals Board . . . that the 
       escalator incident had occurred as Ms. Minor had 
       described it. Thus there are two final determinations 
       directly opposing each other - one made by the 
       Employees' Compensation Appeals Board and the other 
       by the arbitrator. Which is the dominant in this case? 
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. . . . 
 
       [Minor] invokes the federal employees compensation 
       statute (5 U.S.C. S 8128(b)) . . . . That provision 
       obviously relates only to the Labor Department's 
       decision on the making or denying of compensation 
       awards. That realm is the Labor Department's 
       authorized area, and S 8128(b) does not prevent an 
       employing agency from deciding, in an authorized 
       adverse action, that the employee had received a 
       compensation award through making a false claim for 
       which removal is the appropriate penalty. That is the 
       sphere of the employing agency and of the M.S.P.B. or 
       arbitrator on review of the adverse action. 
 
Id. at 283. 
 
While NALC attempts to distinguish Minor, we are 
satisfied that its holding is applicable here, as the court of 
appeals differentiated between compensation proceedings 
and other proceedings in determining the effect of section 
8128(b), holding it binding only in the former. In sum, there 
is simply no escape from the conclusion that Minor adopted 
the interpretation of section 8128(b) that the Postal Service 
contends is correct. 
 
In United States v. Carpentieri, 23 F. Supp. 2d 433, the 
court reached a conclusion similar to that in Minor. 
Carpentieri involved a civil action against a government 
employee under the False Claims Act based on false 
statements he made in his application for employment and 
in his subsequent applications for FECA benefits. 
Carpentieri moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that by reason of section 8128(b) the court could not hear 
the case. Adopting essentially the same position as Minor, 
the court concluded that the False Claims Act action could 
proceed because the government did not seek a review of 
the underlying decision of OWCP "that Mr. Carpentieri's 
submission, if not fraudulent, establishes eligibility for 
benefits." Id. at 435. Rather, the question was "whether or 
not Mr. Carpentieri supplied information he knew to be 
false to the federal government." Id. at 436. The court 
acknowledged that "a finding that Mr. Carpentieri did in 
fact falsify documents to obtain FECA benefits would be 
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philosophically incompatible with the ongoing payment of 
benefits to Mr. Carpentieri," but nevertheless concluded 
that it "would not constitute a judicial review of the OWCP 
determination." Id.. 
 
After careful consideration, we agree with Minor  and 
Carpentieri, both of which we regard as well reasoned, and 
thus will affirm.2 In reaching our result we have taken note 
of the Postal Service's observation that: 
 
       Federal employees may receive payments under [FECA] 
       for injuries sustained in the performance of their 
       duties. The determination of whether to grant or deny 
       such payments is made by the Secretary of Labor, or 
       his designee, and is non-adversarial in nature. 20 
       C.F.R. SS 10.110-18, 615-21. 
 
Br. at 3 n.1. In its reply brief, NALC does not challenge this 
characterization which in any event is correct. See 20 
C.F.R. S 10.0 (proceedings under the FECA are non- 
adversarial in nature). Of course, the characterization is 
consistent with FECA's primary purpose which, as we 
indicated in Lorenzetti v. United States, 710 F.2d 982, 984 
(3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 167, 104 
S.Ct. 2284 (1984), is to create a compromise similar to that 
in workers' compensation laws, i.e., the employee has the 
right to receive immediate fixed benefits regardless of fault 
and without litigation but in turn loses the right to sue her 
employer, the government, for damages on account of work- 
related injuries. See also Miller v. United States Postal Serv., 
26 M.S.P.R. 210, 212 (1985). We are convinced that it 
would be strange if a determination in a non-adversarial 
proceeding had a preclusive effect in an adversarial 
proceeding as "the general rule [is] that issue preclusion 
attaches only `[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually 
litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment 
. . . .' " Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414, 120 S.Ct. 
2304, 2319 (2000). While we do not suggest that Congress 
could not make a ruling under section 8128(b) preclusive in 
the circumstances here, we hold that it did not do so. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Significantly our result also is consistent with that the MSPB has 
reached. See Miller v. United States Postal Serv., 26 M.S.P.R. 210 (1985). 
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We also point out that NALC is taking a position that it 
later might regret if it prevails. Here it contends that under 
section 8128(b) "decisions by OWCP are final and 
conclusive for all purposes and with respect to all questions 
of law and fact" and that the arbitrator thus was obligated 
to respect OWCP's previous finding that Colatat injured 
herself while at work. It thus follows from NALC's position 
that in some circumstances if the OWCP rejected a claim, 
and the Postal Service then terminated the employee, the 
arbitrator would be required without regard for other 
information available to him to uphold the termination. 
Indeed, in some cases under NALC's position an arbitration 
proceeding regarding an employee's termination following 
an OWCP determination would be a mere formality with a 
preordained outcome. We cannot believe that Congress 
could have intended such a result. Instead of adopting 
NALC's position, we sensibly construe section 8128(b) and 
reach the result we do. See Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 
We recognize that in the OWCP's latest decision with 
respect to Colatat's claim it determined that she did not 
demonstrate that her injury was work related and that it 
possibly could change its position again. Because we base 
our result on the ground that section 8128(b) did not oblige 
the arbitrator to follow the OWCP result, a change in 
outcome subsequent to this opinion in the FECA 




For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court 
entered December 29, 2000, will be affirmed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In view of our result we have no need to consider the possible 
application of the doctrine of functus officio  in this case. That 
doctrine, 
although subject to exceptions, provides that once an arbitrator executes 
his award he does not have the power or authority to proceed further. 
See Teamsters Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 985, 991 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
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